Israel's Strategy in Syria: From Enabling Iran to Strategic Loss

Seven months ago, I wrote about the failure of the Israeli policy in Syria, which poses Israel as a main regional loser in the aftermath of the war in Syria. This article has been followed by other articles describing the following changing balance in the Middle East between Israel and Iran to the benefit of Iran and the role of Israeli policies and its traditional strategy and means toward its regional strategic loss.

Meanwhile, the Israeli government and intelligence establishment were in quite different place claiming even achievements in Syria as regards Iran's entrenchment there. The academia and research institutions were in-between. Recently, it came to my attention this article by Ehud Yaari, which is the ever best Israeli analysis I have read in months.

Finally, there is some scholar in Israel has the realistic and true assessment of the situation in Syria and the Israeli policy there along with the strategic conclusion. This is definitely a useful work, as the Israeli governmental and research bodies apparently and generally deem our scholarly contribution (the Middle Eastern scholars) unworthy of been taken into account. Then, I do hope they read and seriously consider this Israeli analysis to change their Syria policy to the benefit of the two neighboring countries and the needed peace in the region.

Here are my comments on select excerpts of the article with a few key highlights:

- "After the outbreak of the uprising against Assad in March 2011, Israel chose a policy of non-interference and refrained from taking significant covert actions to help the rebels topple his regime." On the contrary, there is well-established conclusion in Syria that The strategic decision of Israel is to maintain the outstanding regime and it used its leverage and even lobbied or affected the Western governments, particularly the US government to covertly uphold such policy. The Israeli acts concerning Syria throughout its war would support this conclusion, especially the decision about handing over the Southern region of Syria that neighbors Israel to the Syrian regime in 2018.

- "In the south, Israel had to stop its well-publicized 'Good Neighbor' operation that since June 2016 provided humanitarian aid to the civilian population (and with no publicity, modest salaries to 7,000 rebel fighters). Some of the rebel commanders left Syria via Israel to seek new refuge." At the strategic level, it is also thought in Syria that the mostly peaceful handover of this region in 2018 would not have been possible without an Israeli decision in this regard. Moreover, many Syrian rebels and scholars consider Israel the main party that is responsible for this strategic loss. I consider this handover a key tipping point in the course of the Syrian uprising and war.

- "For its part, Iran keeps adjusting its military penetration into Syria under the pressure of Israeli air force bombings, often on a weekly basis, of its facilities and convoys. Suleimani’s original plan is for now on hold." Iran did established a military capabilities in Syria through a complex network of allied, aligned, sponsored and directly-commanded militias and even regular military troops. The article was accurate about Israeli targets that are precisely just Iran's military facilities and conveys. The other point I want to tackle is the almost mythological Suleimani's plan, which I really don't know who disseminated it, or the trustworthy source that detailed it. The bottom line here is that Iran is extremely pragmatic player with experience in proactively playing on the ground to create assets and achieve interests and advantages, and the proof of that is Iran's success in Syria. Who is not familiar with Iran's pragmatism is not familiar with Iran itself.

- "Israeli intelligence believes that 80-90 percent of the Iranian military presence in Syria has been destroyed." Apart from the math and calculation of the Israeli intelligence, which is most probably not even close to reality and lack strategic and political significance, Iran has the sufficient military assets and capabilities to pose a threat and reach the Israeli territories with various kinds of fires launched from Syria, and it actually proved it when concluded the April rocket salvo on Israel with the Syrian rockets. Then, there is no need for speculation or self-delusions in this regard.

- "The current US military deployment prevents the IRGC from expanding deliveries into Syria." Mr. Yaari again fine-tunes his terms to comply with reality as much as possible. However, we have no evidence yet that any US role or activity in Syria was intended and/or was successful in stalling Iran's entrenchment or diminishing Iran's power in Syria. In fact, Iran has claimed victory in Syria and seeks the international and regional recognition of this reality, as I specified in my previous articles (see the links below).

- "Hopes that the West or the Arab states would offer Assad attractive incentives to break away from Iran’s embrace are wishful thinking." I have suggested previously that the Saudi-led rapproachment and normalization with the Syrian regime is a part of the Saudi-Iranian rapproachment agreement, which is widely considered an Iranian achievement and success. This suggestion is supported by the fact that KSA and Arabs have got precisely nothing from the Syrian regime in return so far.

- "Was there ever an opportunity to avoid the present danger? If so, it was missed." Yes there was such opportunity especially in two places or occasions, the Israeli lobbying or effect on the policies of the US and other western allies, and in the Israeli management of the south Syria file. This opportunity has been definitely missed.

- "Israel now has no choice other than to vigorously thwart the Iranian effort to implement Qassem Suleimani’s strategic prescription of how to overpower Israel." As Israel lost the upper hand to the victorious Iran in Syria so far, it needs to start a new strategy and course of action there. Firstly, playing merely at the tactical level in implementing a strategy was and will always be a prescription for strategic loss. Syria's war was a strategic breakthrough and situation that entails a tailored and deliberate strategy based on realistic conceptions and intended objectives. This breakthrough and its related strategy require new means of achievement as well. Adopting and employing the same old and traditional means will also assure this strategic loss.

Weakening the neighboring Syria and maintaining the traditional governing structure there was a losing traditional strategy with tactical and old means that only destructed and deconstructed a neighboring country and enabled a regional threatening adversary there.

Here are the links of my related articles that are essential to conceive the strategic and geopolitical context of the Syrian issue and its regional implications and consequences:

- Syria in Reality: Iran's Power and Israel's Policy

- Arab Normalization with Syrian Regime: A Victory for Iran or Loss for Arabs?

- Prompting a New Phase in the Middle East: Iran Claims Victory in Syria

- The Changing Middle East: Traditional Israel and Changer Iran

- Iran's Acknowledged Presence in Syria: From Permeation to Imposition