The Internationalism of the Syrian Crisis: The Context and Exercise of the Regime's Interim Victory

The 'internationalism' keeps being demonstrated as an empirical fact in the international field where the Westphalian 'border' of sovereignty of nation-state is actually porous to international inputs and even determinant kind of international 'interference'. In fact, the international input including all kinds of practices and policies is of vital importance and impact in shaping the outcome of domestic-deemed issues regardless of their international ramifications and dimensions. The sovereignty is not a barrier between the domestic and international realms in reality. 'interference' is a term made to maintain the interests of the most powerful actors, and is actually a natural kind of interaction when it is not protected by adequate power. This is actually a reality rather than a theory or ideology.

The ideology is what I invented and became a Keen proponent of it that is 'Neo-Internationalism' where the international natural input in domestic affairs follows internationally-approved values and norms which are mainly based on and derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights for the good of the concerned parties and the international system and wellbeing in general.

The international political phenomenon of 'internationalism' so far is totally related to interfering states' national interests and cynical benefits unfortunately. This international practice is the one responsible for the death of the once very promising rising international norm of 'responsibility to protect' (R2P) by particularly the international inputs in the Syrian issue, as I articulated a few years ago.

After the death of R2P with the rolling death toll of the Syrian people, the international Syria policies have been dictating the fate of the Syrian war and people uprising. As a result, the Syrian regime has managed to win and claim victory and starts to exercise its victory especially in its refusal to implement any part of the teeth-less Security Council resolution 2254. This is a quite normal position as winners dictate their own terms with no need to follow others' terms including the international law and UN's resolutions. That is actually what victory is about.

In this regard, I want to shed light on two turning points that actually contributed, in my view, to conceiving the Syrian regime's victory or at least partial or temporary victory. This is to try to define and understand the tipping points that turned the on-ground state of powers to a political result without detailing all factors of this outcome which are many and certainly include the mismanagement and failures of the amateur, corrupt and agent Syrian opposition institutions and factions.

- The first point is the handover of the south to the regime in 2018 which was the tipping point of the territorial military victory of the regime in my opinion. The almost peaceful handover of the region, which was the cradle of the Syrian uprising, indicates with no doubt that it was brought about by an international decision, especially by the region's neighboring countries mainly Israel. For the Israeli side, this decision turned to be its biggest mistake ever through the course of the Syrian war, as Israel currently watches its primary regional adversary Iran entrenching in the region threatening the adjacent Israeli territory.

- The second tipping point of victory is at the moral and political levels, which is the U.S. green-lighted normalization decision and process with the Syrian regime by the neighboring and Arab countries including the once leader of anti-regime front Turkey. This key development created the political conclusion for the regime's victory and even more it has been a substantial factor of this victory.

The natural anticipated action by the Syrian regime after this internationally-prompted and considerably recognized victory is to exercise it, and that is exactly has been the case. The regime exercised this victory at two also natural levels, domestic and international. Domestically, the regime simply has not changed its governing structure, policies and means. This applies to the entire system and includes the abstaining from even making any significant adjustments to the governance in the regime-held Syrian regions. The regime is substantially staying the course of pre-uprising governance. Internationally and regionally, the regime moved by this victory from not implementing any part of the SC resolution 2254 to ignoring this resolution. Right after the re-admittance of the regime to the Arab League and the Jeddah Arab summit, the Syrian foreign minister made a statement to Sputnik news agency that the regime has previously implemented this resolution by holding multi-level elections. In addition, the regime exercised this victory at this level by bargaining other regional and non-regional states to cooperate in all Syrian-originated regional and international problems and threats, which mainly include the refugees question, narcotics and regional security. Once again, this course of action pertaining to its internationally-prompted victory by the Syrian regime is quite natural and coherent, and without it its victory will be meaningless.

Some critics can argue that the regime's victory is deficient as the regime is not in control of all Syrian territory, especially the oil-rich northeast region, and it is under strict sanctions system as well, which deprive it from vital economic resources. As this critique is somehow sound, it is essential to realize and consider two points. The Syrian regime demonstrated high level of patience and reasonable level of pragmatism, which enable it to maintain its functionality as long as there is no international decision to oust it, and the economic/humanitarian situation in its held region does not reach the breakdown threshold, which is also not permitted by the international powers.

For now, and in this very Syrian and international contexts, the only available and feasible means to contain the Syrian regime's victory is economic pressure as the military pressure is substantially excluded by the standing international policies in Syria. Changing or reversing this course and its related realities requires a change in the international input in Syria and that is the bottom line. Then, this necessitates a substantial strategic change in the Syria policies of the stakeholders powerful states and their underlying strategic views. This objective relies on either a grave Syrian-prompted deterioration in the region that is leading to significant threats and damages to these powers interests, the scenario that has reasonable prospect in the medium-term future, or a concerted deliberate course of action by the Syrian opposition to compel this intended international change, which is quite unlikely.

In conclusion, after the Internationalism of the Syrian crisis folded up the governance issue away to the crisis's international ramifications, the ultimate representation and practical abstract of the Syrian regime's victory is realized by the achievement of turning the Syrian question from a national governance crisis to international, and more precisely inter-states, dispute and issues. All parties who seek to change this outcome should realize and consider this conclusion to tackle this reality and cope with it.  

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